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1Income levels and income growth:
Some new cross-country evidence
and some interpretative puzzless
Abstract
This work brings together two distinct pieces of evidence concerning, at macro
level, international distributions of incomes and their dynamics, and, at micro
level, the size distributions of ﬁrms and the properties of their growth rates.
Moreover, we take into the picture an intermediate level of observation, namely
the statistical properties of sectoral growth.
First, our empirical analysis provides a fresh look at the international distri-
butions of incomes and growth rates by investigating more closely the relationship
between the two entities and the statistical properties of the growth process.
Second, we try to identify those statistical properties which are invariant with
respect to the scale of observation (country or ﬁrm) as distinct from those that
are instead scale speciﬁc. This exercise puts forward a few major interpretative
challenges regarding the correlating processes underlying the statistical evidence.
Keywords: international distribution of income, international growth rates,
scaling laws, growth volatility, exponential tails
JEL classiﬁcation: C10, C14, O11
1 Introduction
This paper brings together two distinct ensembles of evidence concerning, ﬁrst, inter-
national distributions of income and their dynamics, and, second, the micro-economic
evidence on size distributions of ﬁrms and the properties of their growth rates.
Such an exercise entails two major interpretative questions concerning:
(i) the relationships between the distributions of the relevant entities (e.g. countries
or ﬁrms) and the properties of the growth process;
(ii) the identiﬁcation of the properties that appear to be invariant vis-` a-vis the scale
of observation and those that conversely are scale speciﬁc.
With respect to the ﬁrst question, this work links with the stream of studies
in growth empirics concerning the international divergence/convergence properties of
income (for thorough reviews see Durlauf and Quah (1999) and Temple (1999)). We
take a fresh look at the macro-evidence on the distribution of income levels and growth
2rates, based on a longer time series from the updated Penn World Tables, version 6.1,
investigate the shape of the distribution of incomes, test for multi-modality and study
the rank mobility of countries.
Next, we study the properties of growth rates and their dependence upon possible
conditioning factors including income levels and the size of the economies. In order to
address the second question, we compare distributions and growth processes at the two
levels of observation, namely countries and ﬁrms. In particular, we apply to output
growth rates some non-parametric analyses recently used for the investigation of ﬁrm
growth rates. As we shall see, one ﬁnds striking similarities in the growth processes
which hold across levels of observation. In turn, such statistical properties hint at the
ubiquitous presence of some correlating mechanisms which withstand aggregation from
ﬁrms to sectors to countries.
In what follows, we start with a brief overview of the two existing sets of micro
and macro evidence on the statistical properties of the distribution of ‘size’ and growth
rates (Section 2). In Section 3 we describe the data and the variables of interest for our
empirical analysis. Section 4 investigates the international distribution of income, while
in Section 5 we turn to the statistical properties of the distribution of growth shocks.
Next, we consider the properties of sectoral distributions and dynamics (Section 6).
Finally, Section 7 oﬀers a discussion of the interpretative challenges stemming from the
empirical evidence and puts forward a few conjectures. Section 8 concludes.
2 The ‘size’ of ﬁrms, the ‘size’ of countries and their
growth processes: some background evidence
Let us begin by bringing side by side two streams of literature which have been
rarely connected with each other, addressing the statistical properties of ﬁrm sizes
and growth, on the one hand, and those of country (income) sizes and growth on the
other. Start with the former level of observation.
2.1 The micro-evidence on ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth rates
The statistical properties of the size distribution of ﬁrms and of their growth rates have
been the objects of interest of a longstanding stream of empirical literature dating back
to the seminal contributions of Gibrat (1931), Steindl (1965), Hart and Prais (1956),
Simon and Bonini (1958). These pioneering insights and the more recent evidence
(for a broad discussion cf. Marsili (2001)) all indicate a generic right-skewness of the
distribution of ﬁrm size over quite wide supports, wherein fewer large ﬁrms co-exist with
3many more ﬁrms of smaller size. However, the overall shape of the size distributions
diﬀers sensibly when disaggregated at, say, 3- or 4-digit levels.1 Indeed, the precise
shape of such distributions varies a great deal across sectors, and sometimes displays
also two or more modal values.
A tricky issue regards in particular the properties of the upper tail of the distribu-
tion and its ‘fatness’. The evidence so far seems to suggest that at sectoral level such
tails are at least log-normal and sometimes Pareto-distributed.2 Stronger evidence,
however, corroborates Paretian tails at the aggregate manufacturing level: indeed, this
might be a puzzling property of the aggregation process itself (cf. Dosi et al. (1995)
for some conjectures and some corroborating simulation results).
The statistical literature on size distributions is closely linked with the studies
of the statistical properties of the process of growth at the ﬁrm level. One of the
longstanding issues relates to the validation of the so-called Law of Proportionate
Eﬀect (as originally presented in Gibrat (1931)).3 This null hypothesis states that
ﬁrm growth rates are realizations independent of size. Under this assumption the limit
distribution of size is log-normal. The available evidence indeed does not lend support
to any systematic dependence of growth rates on the initial size of ﬁrms. At the same
time most analyses display a violation of the Gibrat hypothesis in that the variance of
growth rates does depend (negatively) on size.
Moreover, recent studies including Stanley et al. (1996) and Bottazzi et al. (2004),
have shifted the focus toward the analysis of the overall distribution of ﬁrm growth
rates. Firm growth rates robustly follow a Laplacian distribution: that is, they are
not distributed as Normal variables, but display instead exponential tails. This result
by itself sheds new light on the nature of the process of ﬁrm growth. If growth rates
are markedly non-Gaussian, then one has to strongly reject the hypothesis that growth
proceeds over time as the cumulation of small uncorrelated shocks. Interestingly, this
stylized fact holds both at the level of the whole manufacturing and at sectoral level,
independently of the degrees of statistical disaggregation (as far as one can go given
the available data).
In a nutshell, the micro statistical evidence robustly displays: (i) persistent
skewed distributions in ﬁrm sizes (and similarly skewed distributions in relative produc-
1Cf. Bottazzi and Secchi (2004) on US manufacturing data and Bottazzi et al. (2004) on Italian
data.
2Pareto distributions yield a cumulative distribution which in a double logarithmic space displays
a linear relation between probabilities and values of the variable itself (e.g. the size of ﬁrms). A
diﬀerent but germane formulation taking ranks rather than probabilities goes under the heading of
Zipf Law.
3Within an extensive literature cf. Ijiri and Simon (1977), Hymer and Pashigian (1962), Hall
(1987), Evans (1987) and the discussions in Sutton (1997).
4tivities and degrees of innovativeness, which we will not review here4); (ii) widespread
diﬀerences across sectors in the shapes of the size distribution themselves; and, at the
same time, (iii) no robust relation between initial size and subsequent rates of growth
(except possibly for the smallest ﬁrms); (iv) a variability of growth rates themselves
which often appears to fall with ﬁrm size5; (v) utterly robust evidence on a Laplacian
distribution of ﬁrm growth rates, which appears to hold across sectors, across countries
and across periods of observation.
Given all that, what is the matching evidence concerning countries? It is straight-
forward that ﬁrms and countries diﬀer in many crucial respects. First, and most ob-
viously, ﬁrms may easily enter and subsequently die. This is much more unlikely for
countries which ‘enter’ and ‘die’ under much more infrequent events of revolution and
conquest. Second, ﬁrms within distinct markets are subject to competitive pressures
which inevitably correlate their performances. The size of one ﬁrm’s market share in
any particular market means the fall of other ﬁrms’ shares. As we shall conjecture be-
low, the very process of market competition is likely to contribute to the explanation
of the observed statistical structure of ﬁrms’ growth rates. This is not necessarily so
for countries as a whole. Of course, it trivially holds that if some countries grow more
than others their share in world income will grow and vice versa. However, there is no
a priori reason to expect that country growth rates should yield statistical properties
similar to those displayed by micro-economic entities undergoing reciprocal competi-
tive pressures. Countries do not necessarily compete as ﬁrms do. In fact they might
well coordinate in order to achieve higher common rates of growth. Under all these
qualiﬁcations, let us consider the macro, cross-country evidence.
2.2 The macro-evidence on the international distribution of
income levels and growth rates
An insightful new set of contributions has recently added to the empirics of inter-
national growth, shedding new light on the statistical distributions of income levels
and their change, if any, over time (see Quah (1996, 1997), Durlauf and Quah (1999)
Bianchi (1997), Jones (1997), Paap and van Dijk (1998)).
Let us start, somewhat symmetrically to the foregoing micro-evidence, from the
distributions of the levels of per capita incomes. While it is impossible to discuss at any
depth the secular evidence, just notice, ﬁrst, that the mean per capita incomes have
shown roughly exponential increases since the “Industrial Revolution” in all countries
which have been able to join it, and, second, that the variance across countries has
4For discussions, cf. Nelson (1981), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), Marsili (2001) and Dosi (2005).
5Some empirical exceptions may be found in the Italian evidence in Bottazzi et al. (2004).
5correspondingly exploded (more on all this, from diﬀerent angles, in Bairoch (1981),
Maddison (2001), Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994)). Given these long-term ten-
dencies, the foregoing stream of analyses, largely concerning the post World War II
period, ﬁnds that the distribution of income levels has been moving over the years to a
bi-modal shape which indicates a process of ‘polarization’ of countries into two groups
characterized by markedly diﬀerent income levels. Clearly this witnesses also against
any prediction of a tendency towards global convergence of all countries to a common
income level.6
Even superﬁcial comparisons between ﬁrm-level and country-level distributions
of ‘sizes’ (which should be properly understood as ‘total incomes of ﬁrms or countries’
and ‘per capita incomes’) reveal suggestive analogies concerning, at the very least, (i)
the skewness of distributions; (ii) the large width of their supports; and, (iii) high
persistence over time of relative rankings.
So far, the statistical properties of country growth rates have been much less
investigated (insightful exceptions include Canning et al. (1998) and Lee et al. (1998)).
Indeed, such properties, and their possible analogies with ﬁrm-level processes of growth
are major topics to their own right which we shall address below.
3 The variables
We measure the per capita income of a country i in year t, say yit, by the country’s
per capita GDP at constant prices and constant exchange rates. The data source are
the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (see Heston et al. (2002)) for 111 countries in the
years 1960-1996.7
Let Yit be the aggregate income. This variable is a proxy for the actual ‘size’
of a national economy. However, a twin interest of ours lies in the level of economic
development of countries. This is primarily captured by the measure of per capita
income. Here we will consider both total and per capita GDP measures and compare
the empirical analyses using the two alternative variables.
Call sit and Sit the logarithmic version of the two measures of income (be it per
6Indeed, bimodality is a property that cannot be detected if one only considers the moments of a
given distribution, as it is ultimately the case when one performs a regression analysis. Instead, esti-
mating the whole distribution oﬀers the opportunity to inspect the statistical properties of the entire
set of observations. The estimation of the empirical density is done by Quah (1996) through kernel
smoothing in order to analyze the overall shape of the distribution of income levels. Bianchi (1997)
used kernel density estimations to construct statistical tests for multi-modality in the international
distribution of income.
7See the Appendix for details on the construction of our balanced panel.




Deﬁne the percentage growth rates in income as the logarithmic diﬀerences:
git = sit − si,t−1
Git = Sit − Si,t−1
(2)
In order to compare the properties of country-speciﬁc variables over time, let us
‘de-trend’, i.e. “wash away” any trend common to all countries in a given year. For
this purpose we consider ‘normalized’ (log) incomes deﬁned by:
s∗
it = log(yit) − log(yt)
S∗
it = log(Yit) − log(Yt)
(3)










We refer to these last variables as the growth shocks of interest.8 Notice that
Canning et al. (1998) only considers total GDP in its analysis of the distribution of
international growth rates, while we include here two diﬀerent measures of national
income.
4 The distribution of levels of income
Let us go back to the evidence telegraphically introduced above. How is income dis-
tributed across the countries worldwide? Has this distribution changed over the years?
As already mentioned, a set of recent contributions which have addressed this question
(cf. Bianchi (1997), Jones (1997), Paap and van Dijk (1998), Quah (1997), Durlauf and
Quah (1999)) all show how the distribution of relative per capita income have changed
from a unimodal shape to a two-humped shape from 1960 to 1988, the years covered
by data from Penn Tables version 5.1.9
8The reader should be aware that we use the word ‘shock’ in tune with a common jargon of prac-
titioners of statistics: however, the terminology does not involve any commitment on the ‘exogeneity’
of the event itself. In fact, ‘shocks’ are endogenously generated by the very process of country growth.
9A point to keep in mind is that all these works use per capita GDP data, while Jones (1997) opts
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Figure 2: Kernel estimation of the empirical density of (log) normalized per capita
income s∗.
9Here, let us consider the time series available from Penn Tables version 6.1 and
estimate the kernel density for the distribution of normalized income and normalized
per capita income. Following the standard notation, the kernel density estimator for a










where K is the chosen kernel function and h the kernel bandwidth. This non-
parametric estimation procedure sensitively depends on the choice of the kernel band-
width. The larger the chosen bandwidth, the smoother the estimated density.
In order to get a preliminary look at the distributions, let us select a bandwidth
with the rule of thumb proposed in Silverman (1986). These exploratory plots suggest
that the estimated densities become less and less unimodal over the years. Figures 2
for per capita data show that the distribution could have been already bimodal in 1960
and that it might have gone towards a three-humps shape after 1996.
There are a few statistical procedures to test for the number of modes of a given
empirical distribution. Bianchi (1997) ﬁrst used the non-parametric procedure pre-
sented in Silverman (1981) to test for multi-modality of the cross-country distributions
of per capita income for the years 1970-1989. More recently, Henderson et al. (2006)
apply to our same data set two diﬀerent tests and suggest that the income distribution
could have been multi-modal throughout the whole period.
Let us perform multi-modality tests on our longer time series. The Silverman test
is based on kernel estimation and relies on the calculation of critical kernel bandwidths
for the appearance of a given number of modes m. Call hc(m) the critical bandwidth
such that for any bandwidth h > hc(m) the density displays less than m modes, while
for any h < hc(m) the modes are at least m+1. Any hc(m) may be used as a statistic
to test the hypothesis H0 : m modes vs H1 : more than m modes. The actual p-value of
the test can be calculated via bootstrapping. When ˆ pc(m) < α, where α stands for the
signiﬁcance level of the test, one can reject the null hypothesis that the distribution has
m modes and not more. This test is known to have a bias towards conservatorism, in
the sense that it leads to rejection in fewer cases than other tests would. A procedure to
correct this shortcoming has been proposed in Hall and York (2001) for the unimodality
test and it allows to calculate corrected actual p-values for a given signiﬁcance level of
the test.10
Bianchi (1997) already discusses some of the problems involved in using a fully
10For a discussion on the advantages and the shortcomings of the Silverman test see Henderson et
al. (2006). The main shortcoming appears to be the fact that Silverman test is not nested and it may
thus yield inconclusive results.
10non-parametric technique. In particular he points out that this kind of test may fail to
detect multiple modes when modes are not well separated. For the particular instance of
GDP data, this may indeed be the case when one considers logarithmic transformations
of the GDP data. The log transformation is in fact a smoothed version of the actual
data and possible modes in the distribution will appear closer to each other than
in the actual data. To avoid this problem Bianchi suggests taking non-logarithmic








We report the outcome of our multi-modality Silverman tests on this speciﬁc
income measure to make our results comparable with Bianchi’s ﬁndings. Table 1 shows
estimates for key years and for all years in the transition phase from unimodality to
bimodality regime. We choose a signiﬁcance of α = 0.1, a reasonable signiﬁcance
level for this type of data. Scores that lead to rejection of the statistical hypothesis
are highlighted in italics, the results for the unimodality test include the Hall-York
correction. We indeed conﬁrm that the assumption of bimodality can not be rejected
at a 10% level, even since 1970. 11
The result of bimodality hints at the apparent emergence of distinct clusters of
countries. It is further supporting evidence against the hypothesis of global convergence
of countries to a common steady state level. Instead, it provides evidence that countries
tend to polarize in ‘relatively rich’ and ‘relatively poor’ countries.
At the same time, the other part of the story, as discussed in Quah (1997), is that
the same shape of a given distribution may conceal very diﬀerent intra-distribution dy-
namics. Is it the case that poor countries have been converging to a common income
level and rich countries to their own high level of income, or the two modes are also
the result of shifting in ranking between poor and rich countries? The issue at stake is
the respective weight of persistence and mobility of countries inside the distribution.
Quah (1997) ﬁnds evidence that the period 1960-1988 has been characterized by high
persistence of relative rankings with low (albeit positive) transition probabilities be-
tween the ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ clubs (and vice versa too). The main events contributing
to mobility are the ‘growth miracles’ of countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan,
Korea and Taiwan. ‘Growth disasters’ include some sub-Saharan African countries
and other impressive dramas such as that of Venezuela which was among the richest
11We should mention that recent work (Henderson et al. (2006) and Goerlich Gisbert (2003)) has
discussed the opportunity of weighting the income variables by population, but we do not address this
type of analysis in our work here.
11Table 1: Results from multi-modality tests: critical bandwidths from Gaussian kernel
estimates and corresponding signiﬁcance score from smoothed bootstrap test (B=1000
replications) for the variable z∗.
Year hc(1) pc(1) hc(2) pc(2) hc(3) pc(3)
1960 0.0034 0.284 0.0026 0.370 0.0023 0.103
1965 0.0035 0.196 0.0026 0.352 0.0021 0.110
1966 0.0038 0.109 0.0026 0.392 0.0021 0.149
1967 0.0039 0.061 0.0027 0.284 0.0022 0.106
1968 0.0035 0.188 0.0028 0.239 0.0020 0.232
1969 0.0035 0.161 0.0023 0.524 0.0019 0.324
1970 0.0039 0.049 0.0029 0.186 0.0015 0.655
1971 0.0041 0.024 0.0030 0.147 0.0015 0.503
1972 0.0042 0.015 0.0027 0.257 0.0015 0.557
1973 0.0042 0.014 0.0024 0.417 0.0012 0.894
1974 0.0042 0.011 0.0024 0.349 0.0015 0.445
1975 0.0043 0.003 0.0019 0.501 0.0015 0.455
1980 0.0043 0.005 0.0016 0.861 0.0015 0.512
1985 0.0050 0.000 0.0018 0.576 0.0015 0.404
1990 0.0053 0.000 0.0025 0.262 0.0021 0.077


































































































Figure 3: Changes in ranking of countries with respect to per capita income (top) and
total income (bottom).
13countries in 1960 and has since dramatically fallen in the ‘poor’ countries club.
With the new data at hand, we re-assess the evidence concerning intra-distribution
dynamics by looking at changes in the rankings of countries with respect to income
until 1996. We present here a quite simple measure of intra-distribution dynamics.
More elaborate estimations using Markov transition matrices can be found in Quah
(1997) and in the recent Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003). Figure 3 provides an impression-
istic picture of changes in relative ranking for ﬁve chosen years, namely 1960, 1970,
1980, 1990 and 1996. One can clearly see that the bottom and top part of the plot
display high persistence in rankings. Countries that ranked very poorly and countries
that were ranked at the top in 1960, both keep their position. Most of the action takes
place for countries in the middle rankings, with both up- and down-shifting even if of
limited magnitude. Interestingly one also observes a higher ‘turbulence’ when rankings
are taken on per capita income.
The result of bi-modality provides descriptive evidence that cannot be uncovered
from regression analysis, but does not per se shed any light on the determinants of
the cross-country distribution. Part of the interpretation involves the analysis of the
appropriate conditioning variables which might account for the emergence of separate
‘clubs’ (Quah (1997)). Together, important circumstantial evidence is bound to come
also from the investigation of the statistical properties of growth rates. This is what
we shall do in the following.
5 The statistical properties of growth shocks
5.1 Preliminary analysis
Let us now turn to the distribution of the GDP growth rates. We ﬁrst plot the moments
of the (non-normalized) growth rates git (Figure 4). The evolution of the average growth
rate hints to two distinct phases, reasonably separated by the year 1973. This major
discontinuity is well known to appear in most economic time series. Also here we ﬁnd
that the years before 1973 are characterized by a somewhat higher average level of
growth, and a lower mean value thereafter. The standard deviation is stable across all
sample years, which implies that in fact the coeﬃcient of variation of rates is higher
after 1973.
Notwithstanding these discontinuities in growth patterns let us nonetheless begin
by studying the properties of de-trended growth dynamics over the whole post World
War II period. Following the procedure also used in Canning et al. (1998), we pool
together the normalized observations for all years and countries and we obtain a sample
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Figure 4: Evolution in time of the moments of the distribution of growth rates. Left
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Figure 5: The relation between average growth rate and income level for diﬀerent
income classes. Linear ﬁts are also shown. The top plot refers to per capita variables
(slope= 0.01131 ± 0.00104), the bottom one to total income ones (slope=0.00269 ±
0.00047).
16As a preliminary point let us ask whether higher or lower income countries are
characterized on average by (relatively) higher growth rates.
We group countries into 40 equally populated groups with respect to income s∗
(or S∗) and calculate the mean annual growth rate g∗ (or G∗) in each income class.
Indeed, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant and positive correlation between the average
growth rates and levels of income, be it the total or the per capita income (Figure
5). Larger and more developed (i.e. with higher per capita incomes) countries are
characterized, on average, by a higher growth performance.
The interpretation of the two relations oﬀers quite diﬀerent insights. When we
look at per capita income data the result that richer countries display on average higher
growth rates can be read as straightforward evidence for divergence and polarization
of countries into two classes of ‘very rich’ and ‘very poor’ countries. Such piece of
evidence does indeed suggest the existence of some form of dynamic increasing returns
in production and in the accumulation of technological knowledge. However notice
that the relation for per capita data seems to be more of a parabolic rather than a
linear nature: for the highest levels of per capita income the relation is not signiﬁcant
or even becomes negative.
Conversely, the positive relation between average growth rate and total domestic
income hints at structural eﬀects of the sheer size of an economy similar to ‘static’
economies of scale.12
5.2 The volatility of growth rates
Are higher income countries characterized by less volatile growth rates? Some recent
evidence (see for example Pritchett (2000) and Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2004)) shows
that the volatility of growth rates is much higher for developing countries than for
industrialized ones. Throughout the process of development the levels of per capita
GDP obviously increase. Together, reductions in the dispersion of growth performance
may also be taken as an indication that countries move on more stable growth paths.
12It should be clear that the possible scale eﬀects that we identify here do not necessarily bear any
direct relation with the scale eﬀect which has been the object of controversy among ‘new growth’
theorists, as discussed in Jones (1999). One of the questionable predictions by the ﬁrst wave of ‘new
growth’ models was the presence of a scale eﬀect on the steady state growth according to which
an increase in the total population, and thus in the available specialized labor force, proportionally
increased the long run per capita growth. In some subsequent models the scale eﬀect has shifted to
the level of per capita income, rather than its long run growth rate. In our strictly ‘inductive’ analysis
here of course we do not make any commitment on the existence of a steady state rate of growth:






















































Figure 6: The relation between the logarithm of the volatility of growth rates and the
levels of income. The relation is ﬁtted via a linear regression, with estimated slopes of
c = −0.32 ± 0.03 (per capita) and d = −0.15 ± 0.02 (total).
18We again group countries by size, calculate the standard deviation of the normal-
ized growth shocks and associate it to the central value of income in each class. Here,
we uncover a negative relation between the log standard deviation of growth rates and
the level of per capita income. In other words the volatility of growth rates scales with
income as a power law. The estimated slope for a linear ﬁt equals c = −0.32 ± 0.04.
We also conﬁrm on our extended dataset the scaling relation found in Canning
et al. (1998) and Lee et al. (1998) for aggregate GDP data. The slope of a ﬁtted
line, however, is in this case much lower, e = −0.15 ± 0.02. This may in fact tell us
that a ‘strong’ scaling relation holds only when one considers the level of economic
development, as proxied by per capita income. Growth performances are less volatile
for more developed countries. The sheer size of an economy is relatively less relevant.
Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2004) conﬁrm a negative relation between growth volatility and
the size of an economy. Their work tries to explain growth volatility with a set of
country variables including total GDP, the share of the agriculture sector as a proxy
for the structure of the economy and trade openness. Interestingly, they ﬁnd in their
sample that per capita income does not play a signiﬁcant role when the mentioned
variables are considered.
5.3 The distribution of growth shocks
One way to deal with the ‘size eﬀect’ on the average growth rate is to group countries
by their level of income in three classes: Low, Medium and High (per capita) GDP.
This same procedure is used in Canning et al. (1998) and Lee et al. (1998), who also
recognize diﬀerent growth distributions for countries characterized by diﬀerent size in
terms of total income. We further normalize the growth rates in each group and then
proceed by plotting their empirical histograms. (We show in ﬁgures 7 and 8 only the
Small and Large Income classes, since the Medium one always lies in between.)
We reﬁne the description of the properties of the distribution of growth rates by
ﬁtting on the empirical densities a general family of distributions, the set of Subbotin
densities. The idea of ﬁtting Subbotin densities to distributions of growth rates is
introduced in Bottazzi and Secchi (2003).














where the parameter a controls the standard deviation and b is a parameter which
determines the shape of the distribution. Note that for a value b = 2 the distribution
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Figure 7: The empirical distribution of growth rates of per capita income (top) and
income (bottom) for two income classes, Low and High.
20as Double Exponential. As b gets smaller, the tails get heavier and the peak of the
density becomes more pronounced. For b = 0 the distribution is degenerate in the
mean. We ﬁt the family of density using a maximum likelihood procedure (for details
see Bottazzi (2004)).
The empirical distribution of the growth rates is quite well ﬁtted by a Subbotin
density with a b-parameter close to 1, hence the distribution is approximately Laplacian
(Figure 7)13. Note that if growth residuals were Normal the ﬁtted curve would be
a parable (’bell shape’) in a logarithmic scale. On the contrary, we ﬁnd that the
distribution of growth rates is markedly non-Gaussian and closer to a Laplacian density
which displays a ‘tent shape’ in the log scale. Note also that the distribution is nearly
invariant when we consider sub-periods in the overall sample years.
Further, notice that the plots in Figure 7 reveal a sensibly diﬀerent width of the
distribution for low income and high income countries, which one should expect given
the dependence of the dispersion of growth rates upon a country’s income level shown
in the previous section. Let us then exploit the two linear relations, estimated as in
Figure 6. We re-scale growth rates as follows:
ˆ git = g∗
it/exp(cs∗
it + d + 1
2v2))
ˆ Git = G∗
it/exp(eS∗
it + f + 1
2w2))
(8)
where v2 and w2 are unbiased estimators of the variance of residuals in the linear
regressions between the (log) standard deviation of growth rates and the (log) size
measure.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of growth rates after rescaling. With this proce-
dure we eliminate any possible size eﬀect on the dispersion of the distribution. The
Laplacian shape of the distribution is conﬁrmed: growth shocks are markedly not
Gaussian.
Still the two distributions for the two income classes coincide only for the central
part of the observations. They diﬀer on the tails, which suggests that controlling for
the eﬀects of the level of income on the ﬁrst two moments of the growth rates is not
enough to fully characterize the structure of growth shocks.14 Possibly, higher moments
play a role. In any case observations at the extremes seem to be crucial in shaping the
13The estimation is done on the normalized growth rates, thus the parameter µ of the Subbotin is
always set to zero.
14Note that this result continues to hold also if one ﬁts the data with distributions characterized
by heavy tails. Indeed, we tried ﬁtting the family of ‘stable distributions’ (which includes Cauchy
and L` evy ones) to check whether the gap between the distribution of re-scaled growth rates for the
diﬀerent income classes was due to an unsatisfactory ﬁt of the Subbotin on the tails. We ﬁnd that the
gap between the estimated distributions for the two classes is not eliminated. Moreover, heavy tailed
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Figure 8: The distributions of re-scaled growth rates for two income classes.
22Rescaled
Growth rates growth rates
Income classes b a b a
Low per capita GDP 0.9829 0.049758 0.9729 0.006895
(0.0014) (0.000048) (0.0013) (0.000006)
High per capita GDP 1.0644 0.029598 1.2029 0.004162
(0.0015) (0.000028) (0.0017) (0.000004)
Small GDP 0.9323 0.050318 0.9308 0.002454
(0.0013) (0.000049) (0.0013) (0.000002)
Large GDP 1.1885 0.030904 1.2092 0.001519
(0.0017) (0.000028) (0.0018) (0.000001)
Table 2: Estimated Subbotin parameters for the distributions of growth rates. Stan-
dard errors are reported in parenthesis.
distribution of growth rates. Another way of putting it is by saying that particularly
high and particularly low growth performance rather than being considered simply as
outliers, might in fact play a crucial role in the international process of growth.
235.4 Conditioning on openness to trade
As mentioned, a few empirical studies have been looking for underlying conditioning
variables that may explain ‘convergence clubs’, that is groups of countries that appear
to follow a similar growth path. Here, let us explore whether a measure of a country
openness to trade is able to provide a useful conditioning scheme to support diﬀerent
growth rates regimes.
We exploit the variable ‘Openness to trade’ in the Penn World Tables 6.1, cal-
culated as the ratio of the value of the sum of exports and imports over the value of
GDP.15
Let us begin by studying the existence of scaling relations for both the mean
and the dispersion of growth rates in diﬀerent trade classes. Figure 9 shows how
both relationships in the diﬀerent groups overall conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Section 5.2.
The average growth rate continues to be positively correlated with the level of per
capita income. While the relationship is the same for countries characterized by Low
and Medium openness, we ﬁnd a higher correlation for High openness countries. One
way to read this result is via the conjecture that those countries that are more open
to trade are, ceteris paribus, in a better position to beneﬁt from dynamic increasing
returns stemming from the access to the world markets. Conversely the same countries
do not show any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in volatility proﬁles (right panel of
Figure 9).
We also looked at the relation between the growth volatility in per capita data
and the total GDP as a measure for the size of an economy (Figure 10). The reduction
in dispersion for bigger economies holds for the whole data set as well as for each of the
‘trade openness’ classes. Putting it another way, the evidence suggests that, overall,
the patterns of insertion as such of an economy into the world system of trade do not
seem to exert any major impact either on the mean or on the volatility of growth rates
– as distinct from the eﬀects of structural characteristics of economies, such as size and
level of economic development.
15The variable is quite volatile, since it strongly depends also on short-run volatility in exchange










































































































Figure 9: Scaling of growth rates (left panels) and growth volatility (right panels) in























































































Figure 10: Scaling of the dispersion of per capita growth rates with respect to the total
size of the economy for the 3 trade classes and for the whole set of observations.
266 The sectoral process of growth
We have recalled at the beginning of this work some characteristics of the process of
growth of ﬁrms and then we have moved to the level of observation of whole economies,
trying to identify similarities and diﬀerences between the micro and macro levels of
observation. However, economies are composed by many distinct sectors of activity
linked with each other by a thread of supply/demand relations and ﬂows of technolog-
ical knowledge. Moreover, individual sectors are also the locus of competition wherein
ﬁrms interact with each other. Thus, the dynamics of sectoral value added repre-
sent a meaningful intermediate level of observation between individual ﬁrms and whole
countries. Let us investigate also at this level the statistical properties of growth.
In order to do it, we make use of the 60 Industry Database compiled at Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (GGDC (2005)). Our sample covers the years 1979-
2002 and includes information on the value added of diﬀerent sectors in 20 countries.16
We consider data for 52 sectors deﬁned at a 2-digit ISIC-Rev.2 classiﬁcation level and
covering manufacturing and services (SIC codes range from 15 to 95).
Let gi,j,t be the (logarithmic) growth rate of the valued added at constant 1995
prices of sector j of country i between t − 1 and t. For each country, we calculate
normalized sectoral growth shocks as:
hi,j,t = gi,j,t − gi,t (9)
where the normalization is done using the average growth rate across sectors in
the chosen country and year.
As a preliminary analysis, we performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for each coun-
try to check whether the distribution of the normalized sectoral growth rates can be
considered stationary in all years. The tests never reject the null hypothesis that the
data for the diﬀerent years come from the same distribution. Given these results,
we pool all data together and study the distribution of sectoral growth rates in each
country of our sample.
Figure 11 shows the empirical distribution for six countries. We ﬁt on each
distribution the Subbotin family of densities. We also ﬁt an asymmetric version of
the Subbotin family where the key parameters a and b are allowed to vary in the left
and right side of the distribution. Indeed, the empirical distributions reveal for a few
16Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, South
Korea, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, UK, and US. We are
aware of the limitations of considering a rather small and relatively homogenous set of countries. At
the same time, this dataset provides reliable and comparable data which would hardly be available





























































Figure 11: Empirical distribution of the normalized sectoral growth rates ﬁtted with
the Subbotin distribution and the Asymmetric Subbotin distribution for a selection of
countries.
28Table 3: Estimated coeﬃcients of the Subbotin density for the distribution of sectoral
growth rates in 20 countries and in some chosen years. Standard errors for the estimates
are reported in parenthesis.
Fit with Subbotin Fit with Asymmetric Subbotin
Country b a bleft bright aleft aright
Australia 0.618 (0.000) 0.050 (0.000) 0.695 0.568 0.050 0.052
Austria 0.643 (0.000) 0.057 (0.000) 0.823 0.520 0.055 0.060
Belgium 0.649 (0.000) 0.072 (0.000) 0.721 0.593 0.071 0.074
Canada 0.757 (0.001) 0.061 (0.000) 0.925 0.654 0.060 0.063
Denmark 0.717 (0.001) 0.084 (0.000) 0.837 0.601 0.083 0.085
Spain 0.603 (0.000) 0.047 (0.000) 0.733 0.507 0.045 0.050
Finland 0.666 (0.000) 0.071 (0.000) 0.901 0.519 0.069 0.077
France 0.723 (0.001) 0.051 (0.000) 0.924 0.595 0.049 0.053
Greece 0.675 (0.000) 0.053 (0.000) 0.852 0.616 0.054 0.056
Ireland 0.803 (0.001) 0.093 (0.000) 0.980 0.694 0.092 0.097
Italy 0.586 (0.000) 0.041 (0.000) 0.675 0.529 0.041 0.043
Japan 0.885 (0.001) 0.071 (0.000) 1.219 0.709 0.070 0.074
South Korea 0.753 (0.001) 0.087 (0.000) 0.939 0.583 0.083 0.091
The Netherlands 0.714 (0.001) 0.044 (0.000) 0.988 0.576 0.043 0.047
Norway 0.644 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) 0.668 0.624 0.079 0.080
Portugal 0.597 (0.000) 0.071 (0.000) 0.679 0.548 0.069 0.075
Sweden 0.797 (0.000) 0.069 (0.000) 0.917 0.701 0.073 0.065
Taiwan 0.812 (0.001) 0.066 (0.000) 1.184 0.660 0.066 0.071
UK 0.720 (0.001) 0.050 (0.000) 0.942 0.591 0.049 0.053
US 0.831 (0.001) 0.060 (0.000) 1.084 0.699 0.060 0.063
countries a clear right skewness: allowing asymmetry in the ﬁtted density improves the
ﬁt signiﬁcantly.
Interestingly, the distributions, again, are generally Laplacian, albeit with signif-
icant cross-country diﬀerences in both the shape and the width (cf. Table 3 for the
estimated Subbotin parameters). In quite a few cases the estimated shape parameter
b is signiﬁcantly less than one, indicating that the tails of the distribution are even
‘fatter’ than those yielded by an exponential distribution. Moreover, the asymmetries
between right and left tails with bigger positive shocks appears to be interesting in its
own right, possibly hinting at the occurrence of those large ‘spurs’ of growth which
Schumpeter suggested to be associated with the diﬀusion of major innovations.
These ﬁndings complement those of Sapio and Thoma (2006) who undertake a
29similar exercise on US data from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database on
458 industries, ﬁnding a value of b of the Subbotin distribution, on average very close
to one, that is, as discussed above, the signature of exponential tails of the distribution.
7 Some interpretations and concluding remarks
Let us put together the evidence and the puzzles stemming from the presented empirical
analysis and propose a few tentative interpretations and conjectures.
7.1 Candidates for an explanation of the tent-shaped distri-
bution of country growth rates
A ﬁrst robust stylized fact, to recall, is that growth rates at the level of countries follow
a Laplacian distribution. This property robustly holds also for subsets of countries and
for diﬀerent observational periods. Developed and less developed countries remarkably
show the same exponential structure in their growth rates even after accounting for
their diﬀerent dispersion in growth performance. A ﬁrst puzzle arises if we compare the
invariance of this property with the evolution of the distribution of incomes. We have
seen how this distribution changes over time starting from an approximately unimodal
shape and getting later to an evident bimodality for which we have provided novel
evidence. How does this relate to the invariance in the distribution of growth rates?
Remarkably, the distributional invariance of growth is a statistical feature anal-
ogous to that found with respect to corporate growth rates: see Stanley et al. (1996)
and Bottazzi and Secchi (2004) on US business ﬁrms, Bottazzi et al. (2001) on the
international pharmaceutical industry and Bottazzi et al. (2004) on Italian ﬁrms. All
these quite diverse data sets robustly display Laplacian distributions of growth rates.
Moreover, we have shown, exponential distributions of relative growth rates apply also
at the ‘intermediate’ level whereby the sectors of activity within any one economy are
the units of observation.
In the industrial organization literature, a common interpretation of the growth
process builds on a baseline stochastic model of growth of a given unit of observation
(e.g. a ﬁrm). If the growth process proceeded as the result of the cumulation in time
of independent growth shocks one would ﬁnd the growth residuals g∗
it to be Normally
distributed and, thus, only representing ‘noise’. Instead, one ﬁnds a very speciﬁc
structure for the distribution of growth rates, which forces to reject the null hypothesis
that growth is simply the outcome of adding independent shocks over time. Thus, one
has to search for explanations of the growth process which admit that the ‘elementary’
30growth shocks are actually correlated with each other. And, indeed, such explanations
ought to account for the scale invariance of such property, since correlation mechanisms
in the growth process appear at all levels of observation, from ﬁrms to sectors to
countries.
This scale invariant regularity is thus in need of a convincing economic explana-
tion. Ultimately two diverse (but possibly complementary paths) seem to be available
for the modeler.
(i) A known statistical result refers to the property that a mixture of a small
number of Normal distributions produces fat-tailed distributions (see Lindsay (1995)).
Thus, a tent-shape distribution can be seen as a mixture of Normal distributions given
an appropriate parameterization. Mixtures are in principle an appealing tool for under-
standing the tent-shape distribution of growth rates because one can envision mixtures
of mixtures of mixtures, capturing diﬀerent scales of observation. Also, one could think
of relating the components of the mixture to groups of countries representing diﬀerent
convergence clubs (see Durlauf, Kourtellos and Minkin (2001)). Nevertheless, such a
statistical exercise still demands an interpretation of the underlying processes of growth
yielding the purported distributional mixtures.
(ii) A distinct interpretative strategy tries to explicitly take into account what we
know about micro-processes of growth, in particular acknowledging basic correlating
mechanisms in the processes of market competition, together with the lumpiness of
major competitive events. Recent research in macroeconomics has proposed a few
models where aggregate GDP ﬂuctuations are explained by micro-shocks at ﬁrm or
sector level (e.g. Bak et al. (1993)). In these models the micro-shocks aggregate in
a non-trivial way: instead of being diluted by the aggregation process, under certain
circumstances they amplify and form the basis for the structure of macro-shocks. In
this vein, Gabaix (2005) shows how a major part of aggregate growth shocks can be
accounted for by the growth of the top 100 ﬁrms in a country.
In a similar vein, the exponential tails of the distribution of ﬁrm growth rates
are explained in Bottazzi and Secchi (2006) with a minimal probabilistic model which
couples a mechanism capturing forms of increasing returns (more successful ﬁrms tend
to catch more business opportunities) together with competitive forces (ﬁrms compete
for market shares). One could think of elaborating a similar multi-country model
(keeping however in mind the diﬀerent nature of inter-ﬁrm vs inter-country competition
and complementarities).
Evolutionary agent-based models are also good candidates within this second style
of modeling (see Dosi and Winter (2002), Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) and Verspa-
gen (2005) for discussions of such a literature in a perspective pioneered by Nelson and
31Winter (1982)). Indeed, preliminary exercises on the grounds of the model in Dosi,
Fagiolo and Roventini (2005), wherein macro-dynamics are nested into heterogenous
boundedly rational ﬁrms, show its ability to reproduce the tent-shape distributions of
ﬁrm and country growth rates.
7.2 Scaling of the growth volatility
The other stylized fact highlighted by our analysis is the existence of a negative relation
between the dispersion of growth rates and the level of per capita income. Moreover
the volatility scales with income as a power law. Its estimated coeﬃcient for per capita
data, c = −0.32, is much higher than the e = −0.15 estimated with aggregate income
data. This seems to suggest that the ‘true’ scaling relation does not hold for size as
such, as measured by the gross product of an economy, but it characterizes in primis the
level of development of a country. The structural eﬀect of the total size of an economy
plays a role, but the stability of growth performances for high income countries stands
out more strongly when the income measure pertains to per capita incomes rather than
the sheer size of countries.
Amaral et al. (2001) and Lee et al. (1998) propose to interpret the scaling relation
by reference to a benchmark model of ‘complex organizations’. The idea is to view an
economic organization, i.e. a country in our speciﬁc instance, as made up of diﬀerent
units of identical size. Then two opposite situations might occur. If all units grew
independently then the volatility of growth rates would fall as a power law with coef-
ﬁcient −0.5 (a result of the law of large numbers, as suggested already in Hymer and
Pashigian (1962)). Conversely, if the composing units were perfectly correlated there
would be no relation between the volatility of growth shocks and size, so we would ﬁnd
a slope of 0.
The estimated coeﬃcients, lying in between 0 and −0.5 may be taken, in fact,
as an indicator of the overall ‘complexity’, or better the inner inter-relatedness of the
economic organization under study. If we translate this into our cross-country analysis,
we may take the negative relation between the volatility of growth rates and the level of
income as evidence of the importance of the internal interdependencies of any national
economy. Indeed, the way income is generated in a country via input-output relations
among the diﬀerent sectors may be a candidate for explaining the degree of ‘internal
correlation’ which produces the observed stylized fact.
Together, scaling relations clearly depend on the number of activities (or “lines
of business”) within the entity under consideration (e.g. a country or a ﬁrm). Keeping
this in mind, one may oﬀer a possible explanation for the diﬀerent observed slopes of
the scaling relations, which could be the following. Economic development is likely
32to be correlated with the density of economic activities or, put it another way, with
the number of diﬀerent economic sectors in which a country is active in. Hence, in
line with the evidence, richer countries, characterized by a higher number of relevant
economic activities, would display less variable growth rates, while poorer countries
embodying fewer activities would be more volatile in their growth performances.17
There is yet another analogy here with the micro level: as Bottazzi et al. (2001) ﬁnd,
the standard deviation of growth rates declines with the number of sub-markets where
ﬁrms operate.18
Finally, we used the scaling relation to re-scale growth rates and we showed how
the re-scaled distributions for the diﬀerent income classes collapse only for the central
part of the observations. One may interpret this result in terms of the statistical rele-
vance of the very best and very worst performing countries. Indeed, these observations
seem to ultimately shape the distribution of growth rates across countries. The ﬁnding
suggests that also the higher moments of the growth rates distribution, in addition to
mean and volatility, depend on the level of income.
The scaling relations analyzed in this work concerned both to the average and the
dispersion of growth rates. A caveat to keep in mind when dealing with such scaling
laws, as Brock (1999) suggests, is that, “Most of them are ‘unconditional objects’, i.e.
they only give properties of stationary distributions, e.g. ‘invariant measures’, and
hence cannot say much about the dynamics of the stochastic process which generated
them. ... Nevertheless, if a robust scaling law appears in data, this does restrict the
acceptable class of conditional predictive distributions somewhat.” (p.426).
8 Concluding remarks
The evidence presented in this work suggests indeed striking invariances in the processes
of growth which hold at diﬀerent levels of observation, from ﬁrms, to sectors, to whole
countries. This work has discussed new statistical results on output growth rates which
are in line with what has been found in the recent literature on ﬁrm growth rates. The
common exponential properties of growth rates which they share mark widespread
correlating mechanisms which aggregation does not dilute.
A puzzling question regards precisely the nature of such mechanisms which might
well be diﬀerent across levels. For example, one may reasonably conjecture that at
micro level ‘lumpy’ technological events, idiosyncratic increasing returns, together with
17Along these lines, see also Harberger (1998) for some insights.
18See also Bottazzi (2001) for a branching model of corporate diversiﬁcation able to account for
such an evidence.
33the inter-dependences induced by the very competitive process, may robustly account
for the ‘tent-shape’ distribution of growth shocks. Conversely, at country level, it might
well be due to, again, some forms of increasing returns together with the inter-sectoral
propagation of technological and demand impulses.
One way ahead in order to disentangle the underlying mechanisms involves, as
Brock (1999) suggests, the joint consideration of scaling laws with other types of sta-
tistical evidence which may provide conditioning schemes useful to reﬁne the evidence
on the data generating process. And here precious insights are likely to come by link-
ing the evidence on growth with that on the processes of arrival of technological and
organizational innovations.
Appendix
The country variables used in the analysis are taken from the most recent version
of the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. (2002)). Version 6.1 extends the previous
Version 5.6 by providing data until 1998 for most countries. The benchmark year has
been changed from 1985 to 1996. We choose to perform our analysis on a balanced
panel of 111 countries whose variables of interest are available for all years between
1960 and 1996. The most notable exclusions of countries from the database are for
entities that have undergone some political transformation aﬀecting the deﬁnition of
their own borders, such as Germany and former-USSR. Nevertheless, the remaining
sample appears to be quite representative.
Table A.1 provides a list of the 111 countries included in the balanced panel.
34Table A.1: List of countries included in our balanced panel.
Code Country Code Country Code Country
AGO Angola GBR United Kingdom NER Niger
ARG Argentina GHA Ghana NGA Nigeria
AUS Australia GIN Guinea NIC Nicaragua
AUT Austria GMB Gambia, The NLD Netherlands
BDI Burundi GNB Guinea-Bissau NOR Norway
BEL Belgium GNQ Equatorial Guinea NPL Nepal
BEN Benin GRC Greece NZL New Zealand
BFA Burkina Faso GTM Guatemala PAK Pakistan
BGD Bangladesh GUY Guyana PAN Panama
BOL Bolivia HKG Hong Kong PER Peru
BRA Brazil HND Honduras PHL Philippines
BRB Barbados HTI Haiti PNG Papua New Guinea
BWA Botswana IDN Indonesia PRT Portugal
CAF Central African Rep. IND India PRY Paraguay
CAN Canada IRL Ireland ROM Romania
CHE Switzerland IRN Iran RWA Rwanda
CHL Chile ISL Iceland SEN Senegal
CHN China ISR Israel SGP Singapore
CIV Cote d’Ivoire ITA Italy SLV El Salvador
CMR Cameroon JAM Jamaica SWE Sweden
COG Congo, Rep. of JOR Jordan SYC Seychelles
COL Colombia JPN Japan SYR Syria
COM Comoros KEN Kenya TCD Chad
CPV Cape Verde KOR Korea, Rep. of TGO Togo
CRI Costa Rica LKA Sri Lanka THA Thailand
CYP Cyprus LSO Lesotho TTO Trinidad Tobago
DNK Denmark LUX Luxembourg TUR Turkey
DOM Dominican Rep. MAR Morocco TWN Taiwan
DZA Algeria MDG Madagascar TZA Tanzania
ECU Ecuador MEX Mexico UGA Uganda
EGY Egypt MLI Mali URY Uruguay
ESP Spain MOZ Mozambique USA USA
ETH Ethiopia MRT Mauritania VEN Venezuela
FIN Finland MUS Mauritius ZAF South Africa
FJI Fiji MWI Malawi ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep.
FRA France MYS Malaysia ZMB Zambia
GAB Gabon NAM Namibia ZWE Zimbabwe
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